
A report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reveals that the United States relied on local commanders and warlords, many of whom were accused of human rights violations and drug trafficking, as part of its strategy against the Taliban. This financial and political support has entrenched a corrupt system in Afghanistan, undermining public trust and contributing to the resurgence of the Taliban…
According to SIGAR’s findings, during its military operations post-2001, the U.S. heavily depended on local commanders and forces to combat Taliban insurgents. However, many of these individuals were implicated in human rights abuses, drug trafficking, and personal corruption.
Former commander of U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, David Barno, has openly acknowledged that many individuals the U.S. allied with had dubious records and were effectively recognized as warlords.
SIGAR’s report suggests that some of these commanders exploited their positions for personal gain, turning local conflicts into part of the international forces’ counterinsurgency mission. This fostered widespread public discontent.
British General Nick Carter commented on Gul Agha Sherzai, the former governor of Kandahar, stating that he labeled non-Taliban forces as insurgents, pushing citizens toward the Taliban.
The report specifically mentions Abdul Razzaq Achakzai, the former police chief of Kandahar, who was accused of extrajudicial killings, torture, and enforced disappearances. Despite these allegations, the U.S. regarded him as a necessary ally in their operations.
American support included millions of dollars allocated for training and funding his forces, which facilitated Achakzai’s rapid rise in southern Afghanistan.
SIGAR concludes that despite being aware of the ethical corruption and human rights violations occurring, U.S. support legitimized these commanders politically and financially, ultimately establishing a corrupt structure in Afghanistan.
Initially aimed at countering the Taliban and Al-Qaeda after 2001, this support led to entrenched corruption, rights abuses, and widespread violence in areas controlled by these commanders. Consequently, public trust in the central government waned, contributing significantly to the Taliban’s resurgence.