A recent report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reveals that the United States relied heavily on local commanders and warlords accused of human rights violations and drug trafficking in its efforts to combat the Taliban. This political and financial support inadvertently solidified a corrupt structure in Afghanistan, ultimately undermining public trust and facilitating the Taliban’s resurgence…
According to the SIGAR report, the United States heavily depended on local commanders and forces during its military operations post-2001 to counter the insurgency and the Taliban, many of whom were themselves engaged in human rights abuses, drug trafficking, and personal misconduct.
David Barno, former commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, has openly acknowledged the compromised nature of many individuals the U.S. collaborated with, as they were known warlords with dubious records.
SIGAR’s findings suggest that some of these commanders exploited their positions for personal gain, transforming local disputes into part of the international counterinsurgency mission. This situation fueled widespread public dissatisfaction among local populations.
General Nick Carter commented on Gul Agha Sherzai, the former governor of Kandahar, noting that he would label non-Taliban forces as insurgents, a move that pushed the local populace closer to the Taliban’s influence.
The SIGAR report specifically highlights Abdul Razak Achakzai, the former Kandahar police chief, who has been accused of extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances. However, the U.S. viewed him as a necessary ally for its operations.
This support included millions of dollars allocated for training and funding his forces, which significantly elevated Abdul Razak’s power in southern Afghanistan.
SIGAR concludes that despite being aware of the ethical corruption and human rights violations, the U.S. effectively legitimized these commanders politically and financially, thereby entrenching a corrupt system in Afghanistan.
Initiated to combat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda post-2001, this support ended up institutionalizing corruption, human rights violations, and widespread violence in areas under the influence of these commanders, leading to a decline in public trust in the central government. Ultimately, this corrupt structure became a key factor in the Taliban’s resurgence.